ATTACHMENT

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Inquiry 3: sought {
                                                                                      }¹ but did not actually
answer the question asked and, oddly, omitted any mention of when it in fact discovered the existence of a
potential breach or a security vulnerability.<sup>2</sup>
Inquiry 5(a): sought information "in detail" regarding {[
                                                                                          1}, the March 31 LOI
Response provided a terse and woefully inadequate response that failed to provide the specifically requested
information.3
Inquiry 5(d): sought a {[
                  ]}, Q Link merely asserted that it [
                                                                   and Q Link's answer completely failed to
address the rest of the question, which asked for {[
                                                                                                        ]}.4
Inquiry 5(e): sought information "in detail" about {
                         ]}<sup>5</sup> This response failed to describe {[
       ]}
Inquiry 5(k): sought detailed information about {
              1 O Link merely responded that Apple and Google approved the app for distribution on their
app stores.6
Inquiry 5(l): sought information about {
        }7
Inquiry 5(n): sought "in detail" information about {[
                                                                                                               1}
Q Link responded only that it uses a crash-reporting tool that "does not monitor App security per se." In
response to a sub-question asking for specific information that O Link {[
                                        ]}, Q Link responded only that it was {[
                                                                            1}
Inquiry 6: sought "in detail" information about {[
<sup>1</sup> Material set off by double brackets {[ ]} is confidential and is redacted from the public version of this document.
<sup>2</sup> See March 31 LOI Response at 3-4, Response to Inquiry 3. Documents provided with the LOI Response suggest
that consumers may have communicated with Q Link regarding the potential vulnerability prior to publication of the
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Ars Technica article.

³ See id. at 3-4, Response to Inquiry No. 5(a).

⁴ See id. at 4, Response to Inquiry No. 5(d).

⁵ *Id.*, Response to Inquiry No. 5(e).

⁶ See id. at 7, Response to Inquiry No. 5(k).

⁷ See https://firebase.google.com/docs/crashlytics/get-started.

⁸ March 31 LOI Response at 7, Response to Inquiry 5(n).

⁹ *Id.* at 8, Response to Inquiry No. 5(n)(ii).

]} Q Link responded with the brief conclusory statement that they "designed the App to satisfy the standards that Apple and Google impose as prerequisites for distribution."10 Inquiry 8: sought an explanation of the basis for {[]} Q Link's responses again lacked the requisite level of detail. Q Link answered that {]} 11 This response did not confirm how Q Link {[} In response to a sub-question asking { }12 Inquiry 11: asked whether Q Link { }] This response was incomplete because it failed to identify {[]}13 Document Request 16: requested {[} Document Request 18: requested {[}¹⁵ {[]} Document Request 19: requested documents {]} It seems unlikely at best that Q Link could have engaged in these activities—and responded to the news report— without {[1}

¹⁰ *Id.*, Response to Inquiry No. 6.

¹¹ *Id.* at 9, Response to Inquiry No. 8.

¹² *Id.*, Response to Inquiry No. 8(c).

¹³ See id. at 10, Response to Inquiry No. 11.

¹⁴ See id. at 11, Response to Request for Documents No. 16.

¹⁵ *Id.* at 12, Response to Request for Documents No. 18.